I study 46 vintages of FRB/US, the principal macro model used by Federal Reserve, as measures of real-time model uncertainty and examine the robustness of commonly applied, simple monetary policy rules. Model uncertainty turns out to be a substantial problem: key model properties di¤er in important ways across model vintages as do the optimized parameterizations of candidate rules. Among the rules considered are rules that eschew feedback on the output gap, rules that target nominal income growth, and rules that allow for time variation in the equilibrium real interest rate. Many rules that previous research has shown to be robust in arti…cial economies, would have failed to provide adequate stabilization in the real-time, real-world environment seen by the Fed sta¤. I identify certain policy rules that would have performed relatively well, and characterize their key features to draw more general lessons about the design of monetary policy under model uncertainty.
Introduction
We have involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand.
-John Maynard Keynes, "The Great Slump of 1930 " (December 1930 .
Over the past decade or so, there has been an explosion of work studying the characteristics of monetary policy rules in general and interest-rate feedback rules in particular. While considerable insight has come out of this literature, so has a fundamental critique, namely that results formulated in this way may not be robust to misspeci…cation of the underlying model. Keynes's metaphor of the economy as a "delicate machine...which we do not understand" seems as apt today as it was in
1930.
It follows that a principal concern for policy makers is uncertainty, and how to deal with it.
The fast growing literature on model uncertainty seeks answers to this question; see, inter alia, Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) , Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) , Onatski and Williams (2003) , Levin et al. (2005) , Brock, Durlauf and West (2007) and Taylor and Wieland (2012) . 1 This strand often employs the rival models method of analysis wherein the researcher posits two or more alternative models of the economy and employs statistical or decision theoretic techniques to …nd a policy rule that performs "well" in each of the posited models; see, e.g., McCallum (1988) .
While this approach to the problem has produced interesting and useful results, it is hampered by the arti…ciality of the environment in which it which it has been employed. In nearly all cases, the models under consideration are either highly abstract or "toy" models that do not …t the data well, useful perhaps for making narrow points, but not to be taken seriously as tools of monetary policy design. 2 Virtually absent from the above characterization of the literature is the real-time analysis of 1 Two other aspects of uncertainty, relevant to monetary policy making are parameter uncertainty ; (see e.g., Brainard (1967) , Söderström (2002) , Walsh (2004) and Kimura and Kurozumi (2007) ) and data uncertainty (Aoki (2003) , Jääskelä and Yates (2005) ). These subject areas should be regarded as complementary to the study of model uncertainty. 2 An illuminating exception to this rule is the paper of Levin et al. (2005) which uses an estimated DSGE model and …nds that a nominal wage growth rule performs almost as well as the optimal policy rule. Comments on this paper by Walsh (2005) express doubts that the current generation of DSGE models is su¢ ciently advanced to be taken seriously for this purpose.
saw the economy and how they embraced those views in the model's structure. This, in turn, had important implications for what policies would, and would not, work well in such an environment.
Armed with these 46 vintages of the model, we ask whether the policy rules that have been promoted as robust in one environment or another are in fact robust in this real-world context. In other words, if the federal funds rate had followed rules that were optimized within the context of the Fed sta¤'s FRB/US model, how would the economy have performed?
We study eight particular rules. The …rst is the familiar Taylor (1993) rule, although we use parameterizations that are optimal for the model vintages we are interested in. We also consider three rules that take up the argument of Orphanides (2001) and Orphanides and van Norden (2002) that the inherent di¢ culty in conditioning policy on unobservable constructed variables like output gaps, policy should eschew feedback on latent variables altogether. Two candidate rules follow Bennett McCallum (1988) , by keying o¤ of nominal output growth. A nominal output growth rule establishes a nominal anchor but unlike, say, an in ‡ation targeting rule, makes no explicit call on whether shocks are real or nominal; because of this, it is arguably less susceptible to supply-side misspeci…cations. Two rules pick up the …nding of Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005)- henceforth LOWW-to the e¤ect that policy should respond to nominal wage in ‡ation instead of price in ‡ation. In this way, the policymaker pays particular attention to the labor market, arguably the part of the economy that, from a neoclassical perspective, is the most distorted. This paper goes a number of steps beyond previous contributions to the literature. As already noted, it goes beyond the extant rival models literature through its novel and e¢ cacious focus on models that are actually used in a policy environment. It also goes beyond the literature on parameter uncertainty. That literature assumes that parameters are random but the model is …xed over time: misspeci…cation is simply a matter of sampling error. Model uncertainty is a thornier problem, in large part because it often does not readily lend itself to statistical methods of analysis.
We explicitly allow the models to change over time in response not just to the data but to the economic issues of the day. 5 Finally, as already noted, it does all this within a class of possible 5 There have been a number of valuable contributions to the real-time analysis of monetary policy issues. Most are associated with data and forecasting. See, in particular, the work of Croushore and Stark (2001) and a whole conference on the subject details of which can be found at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/conf/rtdconfpapers.html models that is undeniably realistic.
The analysis presented herein is, of course, based on the US economy and the FRB/US model. It should be clear, however, that the problems under study are more general than this. Uncertainty, in its various forms, is of concern for monetary authorities the world over as it is for other decision makers. Real-time data issues and data uncertainty more generally have garnered a great deal of attention in the U.K.; see, e.g., Garratt and Vahey (2006) and Garratt, Koop and Vahey (2008) and references therein. On the continent, Giannone, Reichlin and Sala (2005) study realtime uncertainty for its implications for monetary policy while Cimadomo (2008) and Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008) uncover important implications of real-time data uncertainty and, indirectly, model uncertainty for the measurement of …scal stance and the conduct of …scal policy for the OECD countries and the Euro area, respectively. 6 The relevance of the topic for the Euroarea is particularly striking because a large part of the raison d'etre of its creation was about inducing changes in economic structure that would, as a biproduct, introduce even more model uncertainty, at least for a time.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The second section begins with a discussion of the FRB/US model in generic terms, and the model's historical archives. The third section compares model properties by vintage. To do this, we document changes in real-time "model multipliers"
and compare them with their ex post counterparts. The succeeding section computes optimized Taylor-type rules and compares these to commonly accepted alternative policies in a stochastic environment. The …fth section examines the stochastic performance of candidate rules for two selected vintages, the December 1998 and October 2007 models. A sixth and …nal section sums up and concludes.
An additional, deeper layer of real-time analysis considers revisions to unobservable state variables, such as potential output; Athanasios Orphanides, alone or with co-authors, has been at the vanguard of this issue; see, e.g., Orphanides et al. (2000) . See also Giannone et al. (2005) for a sophisticated, real-time analysis of the history of FOMC behavior. 6 Whole conferences have been organized just on the need for real-time data for the Euro area; e.g., the Center for Economic Policy Research conference "Needed: A Real Time Database for the Euro-Area," June 13-14, 2005, in Brussels http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/1/1632/papers/ 2. Forty-six vintages of the FRB/US model and the data 2.1. The real-time data
In describing model uncertainty, it pays to start at the beginning; in present circumstances, the beginning is the data. It is the data, and the sta¤'s view of those data back in 1996 that determined how the …rst vintage of FRB/US was structured. And it is the surprises from those data, and how they were interpreted as the series were revised and extended with each successive vintage, that conditioned the model's evaluation and re…nement. To that end, in this subsection we examine key data series by vintage. We also provide some evidence on the model's forecast record during the period of interest. And we re ‡ect on the events of the time, the shocks they engendered, and the revisions to the data. Our treatment of the subject is subjective-it comes, in part, from the archives of the FRB/US model-and incomplete. It is beyond the scope of this part of the paper to provide an comprehensive survey of data revisions over the period from 1996 to 2007. Fortunately, however, Anderson and Kliesen (2005) provide just such a summary. (Note we show only real-time historical data because of rules restricting the publication of forecast data.) The in ‡ation rate moves around some, but the various vintages for the most part are highly correlated. In any event, our reading of the literature is that data uncertainty, narrowly de…ned to include revisions of published data series, is not a …rst-order source of problems for monetary policy design; see, e.g., Croushore and Stark (2001) . Figure 2 .2 shows the more empirically important case of model measures of growth in potential non-farm business output. 7 Figure 2 .2: Real-time non-farm business potential growth, selected vintages Unlike the case of in ‡ation, potential output growth is a latent variable the de…nition and interpretation of which depends on model concepts. This means is the historical measures of potential are themselves a part of the model, and so we should expect signi…cant revisions. 8 Even so, the magnitudes of the revisions shown in Figure 2 .2 are remarkable. The July 1996 vintage shows growth in potential output of about 2 percent, typical of the estimates of models at the 7 More precisely we show adjusted non-farm business output adjusted to exclude owner occupied housing, and to include oil imports. This makes output conformable with the model's production function which includes oil as a factor of production. Henceforth all references to productivity or potential output are to this concept of adjusted non-farm business output.
8 De…ned in this way, data uncertainty does not include uncertainty in the measurement of latent variables, like potential output. The important conceptual distinction between the two is that eventually one knows what the …nal data series is-what "the truth" is-when dealing with data uncertainty. One never knows, even long after the fact, what the true values of latent variables are. Latent variables are more akin to parameter uncertainty than data uncertainty. On this, see Orphanides et al. (2000) and Orphanides (2001). time. For the next several years, succeeding vintages show both higher potential output growth rates and more responsiveness to the economic cycle. By January 2001, growth in potential was estimated at over 5 percent for some dates, before subsequent changes resulted in a path that was lower and more variable. The very concept of potential growth had changed. Why did potential undergo such dramatic revision? Table 1 reminds us about how extraordinary the late 1990s were.
The table shows selected FRB/US model forecasts for the four-quarter growth in real GDP, on the left-hand side of the table, and PCE price in ‡ation, on the right-hand side, for the period for which public availability of the data are not restricted. 9 The table shows the substantial underprediction of GDP growth over most of the period, together with underpredictions of in ‡ation. vintages show paths that di¤er in two important ways from the others. First, these series are the only ones shown that are less optimistic than their predecessors. In part, this re ‡ects the onset of the 2001 recession, particularly for the August 2002 series. Second, these two latter series show considerably more volatility over time. This is a manifestation of a change in thinking that arose in response to economic conditions of the day. In its early vintages, the modeling of potential output in FRB/US was traditional for large-scale econometric models: trend labor productivity and trend labor input, were based on exogenous split time trends. In essence, the model took the typical Keynesian view that nearly all shocks a¤ecting aggregate output were demand-side phenomena.
Then, in the late 1990s, as under-predictions of GDP growth were experienced without concomitant underpredictions in in ‡ation, these priors were updated. The sta¤ began adding model code to allow the supply side of the model to respond to output surprises by projecting forward revised pro…les for productivity growth; what had been an essentially deterministic view of potential output was evolving into a stochastic one. 10 Further insight on the origins and persistence of these forecast errors can be gleaned from Figure   2 .3, which focuses attention on a single year, 1996, and shows forecasts and "actual" four-quarter GDP growth, non-farm business potential output growth, and PCE in ‡ation for that year. Each date on the horizontal axis corresponds with a database, so that the …rst observation on the far left of the black line is what the FRB/US model database for the 1996:Q3 (July) vintage showed for four-quarter GDP growth for 1996. (The black line is broken over the …rst two observations resulting gap between it and the black line in 1996 and 1997 re ‡ects the strong Keynesian prior of 1 1 It was only a month before, in December 1996, that then Chairman Alan Greenspan uttered his famous line about "irrational exhuberance." In suggesting that equity prices might have been too high to be justi…ed by fundamentals he was re ‡ecting the same Keynesian prior exempli…ed by the early data in Figure 2 .3 that suggested that the strong growth of 1996 was temporary. the day. Then, as can be seen, in 1998 a more profound change in view was undertaken, and by 1999 nearly all real growth in 1996 was seen as emanating from supply shocks. All told, given the long climb of the black line, the revisions to potential output growth shown by the red line seem explicable, at least until about 2001. After that point, the emerging recession resulted in wholesale revisions of potential output growth going well back into history. The blue line shows that there was a revision in PCE in ‡ation that coincided with substantial changes in both actual GDP and potential, in 1998:Q3. This re ‡ects the annual revision of the NIPA data and with it some updates in source data. 12 Despite the volatility of potential output growth, the resulting output gaps, shown in Figure   2 .4, show considerable covariation, albeit with non-trivial revisions. This observation underscores the underappreciated fact that output gaps (or unemployment gaps) are not the sole driver of ‡uctuations in in ‡ation; other forces are also at work, particularly trend productivity which a¤ects unit labor costs, and relative price shocks such those a¤ecting food, energy and non-oil import prices.
A generic description of the FRB/US model
The FRB/US model came into production in July 1996 as a replacement for the venerable MITPenn-SSRC (MPS) model that had been in use at the Board of Governors for many years.
The main objectives guiding the development of the model were that it be useful for both forecasting and policy analysis; that expectations be explicit; that important equations represent the decision rules of optimizing agents; that the model be estimated and have satisfactory statistical properties; and that the full-model simulation properties match the "established rules of thumb regarding economic relationships under appropriate circumstances" as Brayton and Tinsley (1996, p. 2) put it.
To address these challenges, the sta¤ included within the FRB/US model a speci…c expectations 1 2 There were methodological changes to expenditures and prices of cars and trucks; improved estimated of consumer expenditures on services; new methods of computing changes in business inventories; and some expenditures on software by businesses were removed from expenses and reclassi…ed as business …xed investment. PCE in ‡ation jumps again in July 2002 when the annual revisions resulted in new price index for PCE services; see Anderson and Klein (2005) . block, and with it, a fundamental distinction between intrinsic model dynamics (dynamics that are immutable to policy) and expectational dynamics (which policy can a¤ect). In most instances, the intrinsic dynamics of the model were designed around representative agents choosing optimal paths for decision variables facing adjustment costs. 13 Ignoring asset pricing equations for which adjustment costs were assumed to be negligible, a generic model equation would look something like:
where (L) is a polynomial in the lag operator, i.e., (L)z = a 0 + a 1 z t 1 + a 2 z t 2 + : : : and (F )
is a polynomial in the lead operator. The term x is the expected changes in target levels of the generic decision variable, x, c(:) is an error-correction term, and u is a residual. In general, the theory behind the model will involve cross-parameter restrictions on (L); (F ) and c. The point to be taken from equation (1) is that decisions today for the variable, x; will depend in part on past values and expected future values, with an eye on bringing x toward its desired value, x ; over time.
From the outset, FRB/US has been a signi…cantly smaller model than was MPS, but it is still quite large. At inception, it contained some 300 equations and identities of which perhaps 50 were behavioral. About half of the behavioral equations in the …rst vintage of the model were modeled using formal speci…cations of optimizing behavior. Among the identities are the expectations equations.
Two versions of expectations formation were envisioned: VAR-based expectations and perfect foresight. The concept of perfect foresight is well understood, but VAR-based expectations probably requires some explanation. In part, the story has the ‡avor of the Phelps-Lucas "island paradigm":
agents live on di¤erent islands where they have access to a limited set of core macroeconomic variables, knowledge they share with everyone in the economy. The core macroeconomic variables are the output gap, e y = y y ;the in ‡ation rate, ; and the federal funds rate, r;as well as agents'
beliefs of the long-run target rate of in ‡ation, 1 ;and the equilibrium real rate of interest in the long run, rr 1 = r 1 1 . These variables comprise the model's core VAR expectations block which we can write as follows: The long-run expected value of the output gap, e y 1 ; is zero by de…nition, so w is stationary around the vector of "endpoints,"
In addition to variables of this core VAR, agents have information that is germane to their island, or sector. Consumers, for example, augment their core VAR model with information about potential output growth and the ratio of household income to GDP, which forms the consumer's auxiliary VAR. In this paper, we will be working exclusively with the VAR-based expectations version of the model. Typically it is the multipliers of this version of the model that are reported to Board members when they ask "what-if questions". This is the version that is used for forecasting and most of the policy analysis by the Fed sta¤, including, as Svensson and Tetlow (2005) demonstrate, policy optimization experiments. Thus, the pertinence of using this version of the model for the question at hand is unquestionable. What might be questioned, on standard Lucas-critique grounds, is the validity of the Taylor-rule optimizations carried out below. However, the period under study is one entirely under the leadership of a single Chairman, and we are aware of no evidence to suggest that there was a change in regime during this period. So as Sims and Zha (2006) have argued, it seems likely that the perturbations to policies encompassed by the range of policies studied below are not large enough to induce a change in expectations formation other than that can be captured by changes in the endpoints. Moreover, in an environment such as the one under study, where changes in the non-monetary part of the economy are likely to dwarf the monetary-policy perturbations, it seems safe to assume that private agents were no more rational with regard to their anticipations of policy than the Fed sta¤ was about private-sector decision making. 15 In their study of the evolution of the Fed beliefs over a longer period of time, Romer and Romer (2002), ascribe no role to the idea of rational expectations. Moreover, Rudebusch (2002) shows that issues of model uncertainty are often of second-order importance in linear rational expectations models. Thus the VAR-based expectations case is arguably the more quantitatively interesting one. Finally, what matters for this real-time study is that it is certainly the case that the model buiiders believe in VAR-based expectations formation and the model was, in fact, used for forecasting and policy analysis alike; see, e.g. Svensson and Tetlow (2005) . Later on we will have more to say about the implications of assuming VAR-based expectations for our results and those in the rest of the literature There is not the space here for a complete description of the model. Readers interested in detailed descriptions of the model are invited to consult papers on the subject, including Brayton and Tinsley (1996) , Brayton, Levin, Tryon and Williams (1997) , and Reifschneider, Tetlow and Williams (1999) . However, before leaving this section it is important to note that the structure of macroeconomic models at the Fed have always responded to economic events and the di¤erent questions that those events evoke, even before FRB/US. Brayton, Levin, Tryon and Williams Over the years, equations have come and gone in re ‡ection of the needs, and data, of the day.
The model began with an automotive sector but this block was later dropped. Business …xed investment was originally disaggregated into just non-residential structures and producers'durable equipment, but the latter is now disaggregated into high-tech equipment and "other". The key consumer decision rules and wage-price block have undergone frequent modi…cation over the period.
On the other hand, the model has always had an equation for consumer non-durables and services, consumer durables expenditures, and housing. There has always been a trade block, with aggregate exports and non-oil and oil imports, and equations for foreign variables. The model has always had a three-factor, constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function with capital, labor hours and energy as factor inputs.
The model archive
Since its inception in July 1996, the FRB/US model code, the equation coe¢ cients, the baseline forecast database, and the list of stochastic shocks with which the model would be stochastically simulated, have all been stored for each of the eight forecasts the Board sta¤ conducts every year.
Because it is releases of National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data that typically induce re-assessments of the model, we use four archives per year, or 46 in total, the ones immediately following NIPA preliminary releases. 16 In what follows, we experiment with each vintage of model, comparing their properties in selected experiments. Consistent with the real-time philosophy of this endeavor, the experiments we choose are typical of those used to assess models by policy institutions in general and the Federal
Reserve Board in particular. They fall into two broad classes. One set of experiments, model multipliers, attempts to isolate the behavior of particular parts of the model. A multiplier is the response of a key endogenous variable to an exogenous shock after a …xed period of time. An example is the response of the level of output after eight quarters to a persistent increase in the federal funds rate. The other set of experiments judge the stochastic performance of the model and are designed to capture the full-model properties under fairly general conditions. So, for example, we will compute by stochastic simulation the optimal coe¢ cients and economic performance of simple rules, conditional on a model vintage, a baseline database, and a set of stochastic shocks. 17 Model multipliers have been routinely reported to, and used by, members of the FOMC. Indeed, the model's sacri…ce ratio-about which we will have more to say below-was used in the very …rst The archives are listed by the precise date of the FOMC meeting in which the forecasts were discussed. For our purposes, we do not need to be so precise so we shall describe them by month and year. Thus, the 46 vintages we use are, in 1996: July and November; then, typically thereafter the months would be January (but often February), May, August (but ocassionally July), and November (but twice October and once December). Nothing of importance is lost from the analysis by excluding every second vintage from consideration.
1 7 Each vintage has a list of variables that are shocked using bootstrap methods for stochastic simulations. The list of shocks is a subset of the model's complete set of residuals since other residuals are treated not as shocks but rather as measurement error. The precise nature of the shocks will vary according to data construction and the period over which the shocks are drawn. The answers to these and other related questions depend on the model vintage and everything that goes along with it: the model itself, the policy rule, the baseline database and the set of stochastic shocks.
Model multipliers in real time and ex post
In this section, we consider the variation in real time of selected model multipliers. In the interests of brevity, we devote space to just four multipliers. The …rst is the sacri…ce ratio; that is, the cumulative annualized cost measured in terms of increased unemployment over …ve years of permanently reducing the in ‡ation rate by one percentage point. The second is the funds rate multiplier, de…ned here as the percentage change in the level of real output after eight quarters that is induced by a persistent 100-basis-point increase in the nominal federal funds rate. 19 In the parlance of an undergraduate textbook closed-economy model, these two multipliers represent the slope of the Phillips curve and the slope of the aggregate demand curve, respectively. To add an international element, we add an exchange-rate multiplier-speci…cally, the percentage change in real GDP associated with a 10-percent appreciated of the trade-weight exchange value of the US using the FRB/US model, in the Greenbook. The FOMC also receives detailed analysis of policy options in the Bluebook Alternative policy simulations are typically carried out using the FRB/US model. In addition, for the FOMC's semi-annual two-day meetings, detailed reports are often prepared by the sta¤ and these reports frequently involve the FRB/US model. Go to http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/transcripts/ for transcipts of FOMC meetings as well as the presentations of the senior sta¤ to the FOMC. See Svensson and Tetlow (2005) for a related discussion. 1 9 These multipliers could have de…ned di¤erently. The sacri…ce ratio could have been cumulated over a di¤erent duration than the …ve years selected, or it could have been computed in terms of output instead of employment, or the cumulative losses could have been discounted. Similarly, the funds rate multiplier could have been de…ned in terms on unemployment instead of output, or over a di¤erent horizon. The qualitative conclusions would have been no di¤erent for any reasonable alternative. dollar, and a non-oil import price multiplier: namely, the e¤ect on PCE in ‡ation of a persistent 10-percent increase in the relative price of non-oil imports. The sacri…ce ratio is the outcome of a …ve-year simulation experiment; the other multipliers are measured in terms of their e¤ects after eight quarters, except the import-price passthrough scenario which is computed over a 12-quarter horizon.
It is easiest to show the results graphically. But before turning to speci…c results, it is useful to outline how these …gures are constructed and how they should be interpreted. In all cases, we The sacri…ce ratio is a crucial statistic for any central bank model. On the one hand, it describes the cost of bringing down in ‡ation, given that one inherits a higher in ‡ation rate than is desired because of, say, having incurred a supply shock. From this perspective, a high sacri…ce ratio is a bad thing. On the other hand, however, a high sacri…ce ratio re ‡ects a ‡at Phillips curve, which is to say that shocks to aggregate demand of a given magnitude will manifest themselves in smaller change in in ‡ation than would otherwise be the case. From this perspective, a high sacri…ce ratio is a good thing. Which e¤ect dominates depends on the incidence of supply and demand shocks.
The primacy of the model's sacri…ce ratio to policy debates is clear from FOMC transcripts. Mr. Kohn: It is a little higher than we've had in the past, but not much. It is consistent with the model looking out over the longer run. It is a fairly high sacri…ce ratio, I think, compared to some other models, but it is not out of the bounds... Kohn was clearly aware that the model's sacri…ce ratio had undergone some change and was rightfully cognizant of how it compares against alternative models. As it happens, the increases already incurred in the sacri…ce ratio were only the beginning.
The climb in the model sacri…ce ratio is striking, particularly as it was incurred over such a short period of time among model vintages with substantial overlap in their estimation periods.
One might be forgiven for thinking that this phenomenon is idiosyncratic to the model under study.
But other work shows that this result is not a ‡uke. 24 At the same time, as we have already noted, the model builders did incorporate shifts in the NAIRU (and in potential output), but found that leaning exclusively on this one story for macroeconomic dynamics in the late 1990s was insu¢ cient.
Thus, the revealed view of the model builders contrasts with idea advanced by Staiger, Stock and Watson (2001) , among others, that changes in the Phillips curve are best accounted for entirely by shifts in the NAIRU. Toward the end of the decade, a reduction in the sacri…ce ratio became an important objective of the speci…cation and estimation of the model's wage-price block; success on this front was achieved through respeci…cation of how long-term in ‡ation expectations evolve over 2 2 http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/…les/FOMC19960703meeting.pdf transcript of the July 2-3, 1996 meeting of the FOMC, p. 42-47. In particular, the same phenomenon occurs to varying degrees in simple single-equation Phillips curves of various speci…cations using both real-time and ex post data. One paper along these lines is Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) . Roberts (2006) shows how greater discipline in monetary policy may have contributed to the reduction in economic volatility in the period since the Volcker disin ‡ation. Cogley and Sargent (2005) estimate three Phillips curve models simultaneously and apply Bayesian decision theory to explain why the Fed did not choose an in ‡ation stabilizing policy before the Volcker disin ‡ation. They too …nd time variation in the output cost of disin ‡ation. Cogley and Sbordone (2008) show how the trend rate of in ‡ation can in ‡uence the weight on marginal cost in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Figure 3 .2 shows the funds-rate multiplier; that is, the percentage decrease in the level of real GDP after eight quarters in response to a persistent 100-basis-point increase in the funds rate. This time, the red dashed line shows important time variation: the ex post funds rate multiplier varies with initial conditions, it is largest, in absolute terms, at about 1.6 percentage point in late 2000, and lowest at the beginning and at the end of the period, at about 1 percent. The nonlinearity stems entirely from the speci…cation of the model's stock market equation, which is written in levels, rather than in logs, a feature that makes the interest elasticity of aggregate demand an increasing function of the ratio of stock market wealth to total wealth. The mechanism is that an increase in the funds rate raises long-term bond rates, which in turn bring about a drop in stock market valuation operating through the arbitrage relationship between expected risk-adjusted bond and equity returns. The larger the stock market, the stronger the e¤ect. 25 The real-time multiplier, shown by the solid black line is harder to characterize. Two obser-2 5 The levels relationship of the stock market equation means that the wealth e¤ect of the stock market on consumption can be measured in the familiar "cents per dollar" form (of incremental stock market wealth). Also playing a role is the log-linearity (that is, constant elasticity) of the relationship between wealth and consumption. The …nal two multipliers covered in this section cover real and nominal aspects of the interna-2 6 The "active approach" to the presence of stock market bubbles argues that monetary policy should speci…cally respond to bubbles. See, e.g., Cecchetti et al. (2000) . The passive approach argues that bubbles should a¤ect monetary policy only insofar as they a¤ect the forecast for in ‡ation and possibly output. They should not be a special object of policy. See, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) . 10-percent change in the relative price of non-oil import goods on PCE in ‡ation. 27 Without belaboring the details, the salient fact to take from these two …gures is …rst and foremost the variability of the elasticities. 28 In the case of non-oil import prices, the …gure also shows quite clearly another aspect of the so-called great moderation, namely a sharp reduction over time in the in ‡uence of shocks on in ‡ation; the phenomenon of diminished pass-through of exchange-rate shocks into in ‡ation in particular has been documented by Campa and Goldberg (200) and Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) .
To summarize this section, real-time multipliers show substantial variation over time, and di¤er considerably from what one would say ex post the multipliers would be. Moreover, the discrepancies between the two multiplier concepts have often been large at critical junctures in recent economic 2 7 The exchange-rate multiplier calculations in …gure 3.3 are computed at an 8-quarter horizon while the importprice passthrough in …gure 3.4 is measured at 12 quarters. The federal funds rate is held at baseline in both instances.
2 8 The striking change in 1998 in …gure 3.3 corresponds with a shift from a G10 aggregate of trade weights for foreign indexes to a G29 aggregate. The reversal began with a shift to chain-weighting of domestic prices indexes in 1999:Q3.
history. It follows that real-time model uncertainty is an important problem for policy makers.
The next section quanti…es this point by characterizing optimal policy, and its time variation, conditional on these model vintages.
Monetary policy in real time

The rules
In the current context, a monetary policy rule can be described as robust if: (i), the optimized policy coe¢ cients do not di¤er in important ways across models; or (ii) the performance of the economy does not depend in an economically important way on rule parameterization. A robust policy rule can also be described as e¤ ective if (iii) it performs "well," relative to some benchmark policy rule.
A popular simple monetary policy rule is the canonical Taylor (1993) rule. One reason the Taylor rule is advocated for monetary policy because of its simplicity in that it calls for feedback on only those variables that would be central to nearly all macro models. Because of this, it is often suggested that the Taylor rule will be robust to model misspeci…cation; see, e.g., Williams (2003) for an argument along these lines. And indeed many central banks use simple rules of one sort or another, including Taylor rules, in the assessment of monetary policy and for formulating policy advice, including in the Federal Reserve Board sta¤'s Bluebook which describes policy options for the FOMC. In the US case, Giannone et al. (2005) show that the good …t of simple two-argument Taylor-type rules can be attributed to the small number of fundamental factors driving the US economy; that is, the two arguments that appear in Taylor rules encompass all that one needs to know to summarize monetary policy in history. We shall use the Taylor rule, appropriately parameterized, as out benchmark.
Taylor rules have their detractors. Much of the earlier work on robust policy rules has focussed on the importance of estimation and misperception of potential output and the associated mismeasurement of the output gap. 29 Accordingly, some of the rules we consider are those that have been suggested as prophylactics for this problem. In other instances, it is a broader class of latent variables that have been the object of concern. For example, as we have already noted, the productivity boom in the U.S. in the second half of the 1990s, brought about misperceptions not just of the level of the output gap, but also of potential output growth going ahead; these concepts in turn have a bearing on the equilibrium real interest rate since in all but the smallest of open economies, the equilibrium real interest rate is determined, in part, by the steady-state growth rate of the economy. The two problems are related but di¤erent. Mismeasurement of the level of potential output, without corresponding errors in potential output growth, and associated rr errors, are a stationary process. Missing a shift in trend growth is much more persistent and a¤ects a wider range of variables in a fully articulated macromodel. Accordingly, some of the rules we consider stem from the addressing of the latter, more complicated problem.
Most of our analysis is restricted to the class of optimized two-parameter policy rules. This keeps the rules on equal footing in that it is to be expected that adding extra optimized parameters should improve performance, at least for a given model. It also makes keeps the already onerous computational costs to a manageable level. However, as a check against possible idiosyncrasies in results, we do consider a few three-parameter speci…cations.
Two-parameter policy rules
Our …rst rule is the most familiar: the Taylor rule. Formally, the Taylor rule-which for short we will often refer to as "TR"-is written:
where r is the quarterly average of the intended federal funds rate, rr is the equilibrium real interest rate, is the in ‡ation rate, taken to the the PCE chain-weighted price index; e = 3 i=0 t i =4
is the four-quarter moving average of in ‡ation, is the target rate of in ‡ation, y is (the log of) output; and y is potential output. E¤ectively, the rule is written as a real interest rate rule, as can be seen by taking rr and e over to the left-hand side, leaving just output and in ‡ation gaps on the right-hand side. 30 In our …rst bow to the output-gap mismeasurement problem, we also study an in ‡ation targeting rule (ITR); that is, a rule that eschews feedback on the output gap altogether in order to avoid problems from the sort of data and conceptual revisions described in Section 2 above, as suggested by Orphanides (2001) :
For this rule and several others, we allow for instrument smoothing, with the parameter r , and allowing the term (1 r )(:) to pick up the steady-state level of the real interest rate. 31 In addition to the ITR, we investigate a price-level-targeting counterpart of the same speci…cation:
where it should be understood that p t need not be a …xed number; it could instead be (and is) a predetermined trending path for the (log of the) price level such that successful target renders a positive average rate of in ‡ation. The important distinction between a price-level target and an in ‡ation target is that in the event of an in ‡ation surprise a price-level targeting regime is obliged not just to bring in ‡ation back down to the target level but to bring in ‡ation below target for a time in order to return the price level to its target path.
We will also analyze a Taylor-type rule that substitutes the change in the unemployment rate for the traditional output gap in order to allow a real variable to enter the rule while still minimizing the e¤ects of misperceptions of potential output; see, e.g., Orphanides and Williams (2002) :
Notice that this rule, designated URR, is written in the …rst-di¤erence of the funds rate, a con…guration that eliminates the need to condition on the equilibrium real interest rate. As such, 3 0 Our rendition of the rule di¤ers in small ways from the Taylor (1993) original owing to operational considerations. In particular, FRB/US uses PCE in ‡ation instead of the GDP de ‡ator. The model also allows rr to vary over time whereas Taylor kept his at a constant 2 percent.
3 1 In nearly all works on optimized rules, the steady-state terms are omitted for two reasons: …rst, the models used are linear, so the steady state can be taken as zero; and second, no allowance is made for shifting steady states. (An exception is Orphanides and Williams (2002) who speci…cally consider rr that shift over time.) Because we are using real models with real databases, and we are considering persistent deviations from steady state-indeed arguably this is a large part of the problem of interest-we need to retain these steady-state terms.
the URR takes a step towards insulation against persistent shocks to productivity and associated mismeasurements of rr .
Another much touted rule is the nominal output growth rule, along the lines suggested by Bennett McCallum (1988) and Feldstein and Stock (1994) and revisited recently by Dennis (2001) and Rudebusch (2002) . Its purported advantage is that it parsimoniously includes both prices and real output growth but without taking a stand on the split between the two; for this reason it is said to be able to withstand productivity shocks. Detractors note that because output typically leads in ‡ation, responding to the sum of the two is not as obviously bene…cial as presumed. We experiment with two versions. The …rst is designated with the rubric "YNR I", and is written as:
where yn is (the log of) nominal output, and yn is the target level of nominal output growth. This rendition follows the formulation of McCallum and Nelson (1999) and nests the versions studied by Rudebusch (2002) . However because YNR I embodies output growth within its speci…cation, albeit with its coe¢ cient restricted to equal that of GDP price in ‡ation, but not a term the level of resources utilization, we augment our analysis by including a second rendition:
This version, which we designate as "YNR II," has the virtue of being comparable to TR in that other than substituting nominal output growth for in ‡ation, it is identical.
We also pick up on the …nding of LOWW (2005) to the e¤ect that a policy that responds to nominal wage in ‡ation (WR I) instead of nominal price in ‡ation, performs well. In this way, the policymaker pays particular attention to that part of the economy that, from a neoclassical perspective, is arguably is the most distorted. Like the nominal output growth targeting rule, because wage setting is supposed to re ‡ect both price in ‡ation and labor productivity, the nominal wage growth rule also has the merit of implicitly incorporating changes in trend productivity.
where w is (the log of) the nominal wage rate. In parallel fashion to our nominal output rules here, too, we consider a second version of the nominal wage growth rule that replaces the lagged instrument with the output gap. As a convenient short hand, we refer to this rule as "WR II":
Three-parameter policy rules
As noted, the benchmark from which all our rules are to be compared is the optimized version of the Taylor rule. There is, however, a chance that this choice is inappropriate. It is possible that the two-parameter Taylor rule is too parsimonious to adequately respond to the myriad economic disturbances to which the economy is subjected. In recognition of this possibility, we also explore a dynamic Taylor rule-let us call it "xTR" where the "x" means "extended" to add the lagged instrument as an argument:
This rule is the most commonly studied extension on the static Taylor rule; Williams (2003) argues that the inclusion of the lagged instrument can provide signi…cant bene…ts in terms of economic outcomes in linearized New Keynesian models.
We also consider the same extension applied to some of the other rules so that each has a di¤erent nominal anchor but contains both the output gap and the lagged instrument, and to the URR so that it too carries a lagged instrument term plus an in ‡ation term.
Lastly, because it is possible that concepts like the output gap cannot do justice to the real-side phenomena that bu¤et the economy in a world of where productivity shocks are prevalent, it seems prudent to consider conditioning policy speci…cally on potential output growth. At the same time,
to be realistic, one should use not ex post measures of potential growth but rather the estimates that modelers were working with in real time. We can do so with the following rule, which we call the potential growth rule (Y*R):
where y is the vintage-consistent estimate of potential output growth. The terms rr and Y y together can be taken as a reworked estimate of the equilibrium of the equilibrium real rate, one that corrects potential output growth.
Together, these rules encompass a broad range of the rules that have been proposed as robust to model misspeci…cation, and do so in a generic way in that their arguments do not depend on idiosyncrasies of the FRB/US model.
The policy problem
Formally, a policy rule is optimized by choosing the parameters of the rule, = f i ; j g i; j = f ; y; r; y ; yn; u; wg; i 6 = j, to minimize a loss function subject to a given model vintage, x = f ( ); and a given set of stochastic shocks, : In our case, this is:
subject to:
x t = f (x t ; : : : x t j ; z t ; : : : z t k ; r t ; : : : r t m ) + v t j; k; m 1 0
and
where u is the unemployment rate, u is the vintage consistent estimate of the natural rate of unemployment, x is a vector of endogenous variables, and z a vector of exogenous variables, both in logs, except for those variables measured in rates. Note that ; y; y ; u; r; rr ; w; yn 2 x while ; u 2 z: 32 In principle, the loss function, (2), could have been derived as the quadratic approximation to the true social welfare function for the FRB/US model. However, it is technically infeasible for a model the size of FRB/US. That said, with the possible exception of the term penalizing the change in the federal funds rate, the arguments to (2) are standard. 33 The penalty on the change in the funds rate may be thought of as representing either a hedge against model uncertainty in order to reduce the likelihood of the fed funds rate entering ranges beyond those for which the model was estimated, or as a pure preference of the Committee. Whatever the reason for its presence, the literature con…rms that some penalty is needed to explain the historical persistence of monetary policy; see, e.g., Sack and Wieland (2000) .
The optimal coe¢ cients of a given rule are a function of the model's stochastic shocks, as equation (5) indicates. 34 The optimized coe¢ cient on the output gap, for example, represents not only the fact that unemployment-rate stabilization-and hence, indirectly, output-gap stabilization-is an objective of monetary policy, but also that in economies where demand shocks play a signi…cant role, the output gap will statistically lead changes in in ‡ation in the data; so the output gap will appear because of its role in forecasting future in ‡ation. However, if the shocks for which the rule is optimized turn out not to be representative of those that the economy will ultimately bear, performance will su¤er. As we shall see, this dependence will turn out to be signi…cant for our results. 35
Computation
Solving a problem like this is easily done for small, linear models; FRB/US, however, is a large, non-linear model. Given the size the model, and the di¤erences across vintages, we optimized the policy rule coe¢ cients employing a sophisticated derivative-free optimization procedure with distributed processing. Speci…cally, each vintage of the model is subjected to bootstrapped shocks from its stochastic shock archive. Historical shocks from the estimation period of the key behavioral equations are drawn. 36 In all, 1500 draws of 80 periods each are used for each vintage to evaluate candidate parameterizations. The target rate of in ‡ation is taken to be two percent as measured and output gaps over the business cycle.
by the annualized rate of change of the personal consumption expenditure price index. 37 The algorithm is described in detail in Gray and Kolda (2004) and Kolda (2004) ; here we provide just a thumbnail sketch. In the …rst step, the rule is initialized with a starting guess; that guess and some neighboring points are evaluated. Since all our rules are two-parameter rules, we need only investigate four neighboring points: higher and lower, by some step size, for each of the two parameters, with the initial guess in the middle. The loss function is evaluated for each of the …ve points and one with the lowest loss becomes the center of the next cluster of …ve points. As the …ve points become less and less distinguishable from one another, the step size is reduced until the convergence criterion is satis…ed.
Optimization of a two-parameter policy rule using a single Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz machine can take over ten hours, depending on the rule; distributed processing speeds things up. Because this is exercise is computationally intensive we are limited in the range of preferences we can investigate.
Accordingly, we discuss only one set of preferences: equal weights on output, in ‡ation and the change in the federal funds rate. This is the same set of preferences that have been used in optimal policy simulations carried out for the FOMC; see Svensson and Tetlow (2005) .
Results
The Taylor rule
Let us begin with the Taylor rule (TR). In this instance, we provide a full set of results-that is, optimized parameters for each of the 46 vintages; later we will narrow our focus. The results are best summarized graphically. In Figure 5 .1, the blue solid line is the optimized coe¢ cient for the TR on in ‡ation, , while the red dashed line is feedback coe¢ cient on the output gap, Y .
Perhaps the most noteworthy observation from 5.1 is the distinct upward creep, on average, in both parameters. The in ‡ation response coe¢ cient never actually gets very large: it starts out quite low and only in the new century does it climb above the 0. supply-side disturbances and subsequent e¤ects on aggregate demand, particularly over the longer term. 39 The new investment block, in turn, was driven by two factors: the earlier inclusion by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of software in the de…nition of equipment spending and the capital stock, and associated enhanced appreciation on the part of the sta¤ of the importance of the ongoing productivity and investment boom. In any case, while the upward jump in the gap coe¢ cient stands out, it bears recognizing that the rise in the gap coe¢ cient was a continual process.
The point to be taken from Figure 5 .1 is that the time variation in model properties, described in Section 3, carries over into substantial variation in the optimized TR policy parameters. At the same time, it is clear that time variation in the multipliers is not the sole reason why optimized TR coe¢ cients change. In fact, changes in the stochastic structure of the economy are also in play. To the extent these di¤erences in optimized parameters, conditional on the stochastic shocks, imply signi…cant di¤erences in economic performance, we can say that model uncertainty is a signi…cant problem. We can examine this question by comparing the performance of the optimized TR against other plausible parameterizations. For this exercise and nearly all that follow, we narrow our focus to just two vintages: the December 1998 vintage and the October 2007 vintage. (The optimized
Taylor rule coe¢ cients associated with these vintages are indicated in the …gure by the gray bars.)
These particular vintages were chosen because they were far apart in time, thereby re ‡ecting as di¤erent views of the world as this environment allows, and because their properties are among the most di¤erent of any in the set.
In the next section we examine the implications for economic performance of the TR and the other optimized simple rules for two selected model vintages.
Optimized rules and performance
Two-parameter rules
To this point, we have compared model properties and optimized policies but have had nothing directly to say about performance. This section …lls this void. We consider the performance, on average of the model economies under stochastic simulation. We also expand our study to encompass the wider range of simple rules introduced in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. At the same time, in order to make the computational costs feasible, we focus on results for the two selected vintages. Table 2 shows the performance for the complete set two-parameter rules. The table is divided into two panels, one for each of the December 1998 and October 2007 vintages. In both panels, losses have been normalized on the performance of the optimized Taylor rule so that the e¢ cacy of other rules can be interpreted as multiples of the TR loss. Before delving into the numbers, it is useful to recall that the results in this table pertain to monetary authorities that understand the nature of the economy they control, including the shocks to which the economy is subject. That is, we are setting aside, for the moment, the issue of model uncertainty, which we take up in the next section. With this in mind let us focus for the moment on the optimized parameters and normalized losses for the December 1998 vintage shown in left-hand panel of Table 2 . The results show, …rst, why the TR has been a popular speci…cation for policy design: it renders a very good performance with losses that are lower than nearly all of the alternatives. The one rule that outperforms TR is WR II which is identical to the Taylor rule but replaces price in ‡ation with wage in ‡ation, shown on line 8. This rule is a version of the rule championed by LOWW (2005) on the grounds that in many models, it is wages that is the source of most nominal stickiness. It is not simply feedback on wages that is important to this result, however; the performance of WR I, on line 7, shows that a rule that replaces price in ‡ation with wage in ‡ation as the nominal anchor, but omits direct feedback on the output gap in favor of persistence in funds-rate setting through the presence of a lagged funds rate is the worst rule among those shown. There are other rules that are not far behind the TR in terms of performance, including the (change in) unemployment rate rule, URR, line 4, with a loss only of 19 percent more than the Taylor rule, and the price-level targeting rule, line 3, which carries a loss only slightly above that of the Taylor rule. This latter result may seem familiar to results seen elsewhere that show strong performance of price-level targets. However, to the best of our knowledge, prior results have been exclusively for linear rational expectations models where the powerful role of expectations in strengthening the error-correcting properties of such rules is paramount. That good performance arises from a price-level target in our VAR-based expectations approach is remarkable. Of related interest is the fact that the price-level rule signi…cantly outperforms the ITR. In ‡ation targeting allows "bygones to be bygones" in the control of the price level, whereas price-level errors have to be reversed in price-level targeting regimes. Reversing price-level errors is a good thing when agents know that the central bank will do this, because anticipated reversals of the price level implies strongly anchored expectations for the in ‡ation rate. When expectations are "boundedly rational," however, the conventional wisdom has been that bringing the price level back to some predetermined path will be all cost and no bene…t. We see here that this is not so for the VAR-based expectations of the FRB/US model.
More generally, the performances of the other rules are not greatly di¤erent from the Taylor rule; as noted, the WR I performs the worst, but its loss is only about 1-1/2 times that of the TR, not a good performance but not disastrous either. Evidently, controlling the economy of the December 1998 vintage is a relatively straightforward task.
Let us turn now to the right-hand panel where we show parallel results for the October 2007
vintage. Here, once again, the TR does pretty well, on average, but in this instance there are two rules that do better, the price-level rule and the URR. We have already noted that parameterizations of these rules did well in the December 1998 vintage. In addition, two other rules also performed almost as well as the TR: the YNR II and WR II. These rules share two important features. First, they employ feedback on a nominal variable that attempts to correct, albeit indirectly, for trend productivity growth and errors in its measurement. Second, they maintain feedback on the output gap. Thus, notwithstanding the mismeasurement issues associated with persistent changes in productivity growth, feedback on the output gap, which is subject to errors in productivity levels, is still bene…cial, as can be seen by comparing line 6 with line 5, on the one hand, and line 8 with line 7, on the other. In other words, these two rules produce good results but not entirely for the reasons for which these rules were originally advocated.
The last word on this panel concerns, once again, the ITR. Its performance controlling the October 2007 vintage could fairly be described as terrible, at 4-1/2 times the loss of the Taylor by garden-variety demand shocks, whereas the latter had large and persistent disturbances to aggregate supply; in particular, the productivity boom of the second half of the 1990s. Moreover, many of the key shocks borne during the more recent period were larger than was the case in the earlier period. 40 An implication of productivity booms is that they disrupt the "normal" timeseries relationship between output (or employment) and in ‡ation: when output ‡uctuations are dominated by demand shocks, and prices are sticky, output will statistically lead in ‡ation and the optimized parameters of rules like the Taylor rule will re ‡ect that relationship. When demand shocks are the prevalent force behind output ‡uctuations there is no dilemma for monetary policy:
stabilizing output and stabilizing in ‡ation are simultaneously achievable because they are one and the same. It follows that one can feedback on output (or its proxies) or in ‡ation, and achieve good results either way. However when supply shocks drive cycles, in ‡ation and output will tend to move in opposite directions, setting up a dilemma for the policymaker. Under these circumstances, responding to output and to in ‡ation or no longer good substitutes for the purposes of minimizing losses and responding strictly to in ‡ation is insu¢ cient for controlling output.
4 0 This argument will clash with the intuition of a number of readers who may be familiar with the literature on the Great Moderation which suggests that shocks in the most recent period are smaller than they once were. The explanation is two-fold: …rst, the period we are dealing with here is much shorter and has smaller residuals in both datasets. Just as important perhaps is a falacy in the construction of the residuals in many studies that allege that shocks are smaller recently. The regressions from which these conclusions are drawn allow either a time trend or a free constant so that persistent supply-side shocks are mopped up in these terms. Table 3 tests the appropriateness of using the two-parameter Taylor rule as our benchmark by considering the simple extensions noted in section 4.1.2. In particular, the second row of the table shows that the performance of a Taylor extended to allow an optimized parameter on the lagged instrument renders only slightly better performance the TR itself, for either vintage. Moreover, the attempt through the use of a productivity growth term in the Y*R fares worse, as shown in the third line. 41 The …nal two lines of the table exhibit the advantage of allowing feedback on the lagged instrument relative to the YNR II. This is the one case where adding the lagged instrument to a rule that already has a nominal anchor variable and an aggregate demand term pays o¤ in a signi…cant way. Still, none of these rules do markedly better than the Taylor rule despite the advantage of an added parameter. We thus conclude that using the Taylor rule as our benchmark is not erecting a straw man. We also satis…ed that focussing our attention, henceforth, on two-parameter policy rules is a suitable restriction.
Three-parameter rules
Our goal in this paper has been to uncover policies that are robust across models. To this point, we have identi…ed rules which when properly speci…ed, perform well in contexts where they should perform well. The ones that do not-the in ‡ation targeting rule, and nominal income and wage growth rules that include the lagged instrument as their second argument-are not candidates as robust performers. Whether those rules that are strong performers in their own environments are also robust is the subject of the next section.
Robustness
We now turn our principal issue, the robustness of optimized policies to model misspeci…cation.
The thought experiment is to imagine a policymaker that believes she is controlling the December 1998 economy model, but in half of the instances we discuss below, it turns out that it is the October 2007 vintage that is the true model. Those results are presented in Table 4 . Then, in Table 5 , we reverse the exercise by having that our central banker assume she is controlling the October 2007 vintage but it turns out that half of the time, it is the December 1998 vintage that is the correct model.
The same eight two-parameter rules as before are considered, with 16 parameterizations. We subject both of these models to same set of stochastic shocks as in the optimization exercise, for each candidate rule. As before, we are mostly interested in normalized losses where the normalization sets the loss under the appropriate optimized TR policy to unity (although we do show the absolute losses, for completeness). Before we proceed with the results, it is worth recalling that, at the risk of oversimplication, that the December 1998 vintage is a model that sees the US economy as being relatively stable and easy to control: rule parameterizations that are optimal for the December 1998 vintage are generally less aggressive than their October 2007 counterparts. Beginning with the TR, where the normalized loss is unity by de…nition, we see that a policymaker who uses the October 2007 parameterization of that rule incurs losses about two-thirds higher what she could have achieved had she known the true model; the Taylor rule is not particularly robust in this sense. The in ‡ation-targeting rule, not a particularly good performer at the best of circumstances, is disastrous when misspeci…ed, as shown on line 4. Among the top performers-at least when the true economy turns out to be the December 1998 vintage-are the price-level rule, lines 5 and 6, the change-in-unemployment rule, lines 11 and 12, and the wagegrowth rule that includes the gap, lines 15 and 16. Each of these rules performs at least as well as the Taylor rule when misspeci…ed, and provides performance that is close to that of the Taylor when properly speci…ed. 42 The YNR II is not far o¤ the mark set by the optimized Taylor rule. Table 5 turns the exercise around by considering the case where the October 2007 vintage turns out to be the correct one. Misspeci…cation of the Taylor rule is more costly here: the deterioration relative to the best policy parameterization is 80 percent. Once again, the ITR performs very poorly, while most of the rules that do include feedback on the output gap-the Taylor rule, the price-level rule, one of the nominal-output rules, and the change-in-unemployment rule, all perform well. The one notable exception to the conclusion that feedback on the output gap is always a good thing is the WR II where misspeci…cation of the rule, as in line 16, results in large losses relative to the Taylor and most alternatives to it. Even here, though, its seems that it is feedback on wage growth that is the key to this result as the rules in lines 13 and 14, which respond to wage growth and the lagged instrument, but not the output gap, perform even worse. What this tells us is that while a wage-growth rule can turn in a very good performance, as it does when paired with the output gap on line 15, a good calibration is critical to its performance; the rule is not robust.
The PLR turns in an even stronger performance for the October 2007 vintage than it did for the December 1998 one. This result obtains notwithstanding that the parameterizations of the two rules di¤er signi…cantly: the feedback parameters on the output gap are 1.14 and 0.46. As in rational expectations models, an important contribution to economic performance under this rule is that constraining the drift in the price level anchors in ‡ation ‡uctuations. In both vintages of the FRB/US model, keeping in ‡ation in check also limits cycling in long-term expected in ‡ation.
The stability of long-term in ‡ation expectations reinforces the stabilizing force of policy making output stabilization less critical than would otherwise be the case. 43 This case contrasts sharply with the URR. For this rule, feedback on in ‡ation itself is slight at 0.08 and 0.16. But feedback on the change in the unemployment rate is vigorous: -3.60 and -2.52. Thus, aggressively tempering ‡uctuations in unemployment is substituting for in ‡ation (and price-level) control. The fact that the URR is written in the …rst-di¤erence of the instrument, and therefore does not depend on estimates of the equilibrium real rate of interest is also a factor; this means that the instrument can …nd the right level even when a productivity shock changes what that level should be. The URR is the one rule of which we are aware that was tested, by Orphanides and Williams (2002) , in an environment that allowed for persistent, unobserved shocks to the "natural rate of interest," and found to execute well. The results for URR is Tables 4 and 5 suggest that it could be a robust rule. We can take a closer look at the robustness of URR by computing its optimized parameters for all vintages. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 6 .1.
The …gure shows that the coe¢ cient on in ‡ation, the solid red line, is never much above zero, regardless of the vintage. By contrast, the coe¢ cient on the change in the unemployment rate, the dashed blue line, jumps around somewhat with perhaps a slight tendency to increase, in absolute terms, over time. The range over the complete set of vintages for the coe¢ cient on the change in the unemployment rate spans from a low of -1.4 for the November 1999 vintage, to a high of Tables 4 and 5 while focussing on the unemployment rate rule. We do this it Table 6 below where we consider the performance of the most extreme parameterizations of the rule in our two benchmark vintages.
. when either of our benchmark models is subjected controlled by the most extreme parameterization of the URR, the small absolute coe¢ cient on the (change in the) unemployment rate in the November 1999 vintage, the deterioration in control increases the loss relative to the best possible parameterization by a bit over 50 percent, as shown on line 2 of the table.
The parameterization that rendered the largest coe¢ cient on the change in the unemployment rate, 
Concluding remarks
For central banks, the appropriate design of monetary policy under uncertainty is a critical issue.
Many conferences are devoted to the subject and the list of papers is lengthy and still growing. In nearly all instances, however, the articles, whether they originate from central banks themselves or from academia, have tended to be abstract applications. One posits an idealized model, or several models, of the economy and investigates, in some way, how missperceptions of, or perturbations to, the model a¤ect outcomes. A good deal has been learned from these exercises, but results have tended to be speci…c to the environment of the chosen models. Moreover, the models themselves typically have not been representative of the models upon which central banks rely. It is di¢ cult to know how serious a problem model uncertainty is if one cannot give a concrete and meaningful measure of uncertainty. This paper has cast some light on model uncertainty and the design of policy in a much di¤erent context from the extant literature. We have examined 46 vintages of the model the Federal Reserve Board sta¤ has used to carry out forecasts and policy analysis from 1996 to 2007. And we have done so in a real-time context that focusses on the real problems that the Fed faced over this period. Our examination looked at a number of simple policy rules that have been marketed as "robust." In the end, we uncovered a number of useful observations. First, model uncertainty is a substantial problem. Changes to the FRB/US model over the period of study were frequent and often important in their implications. The ensuing optimized policies also di¤ered signi…cantly in their parameterizations. Second, many simple rules that have been touted as robust, turn out to be less appealing than one might have suspected. In particular, pure in ‡ation targeting rules and indeed nearly all rules that fail to respond to measures of aggregate demand turn out not to be robust. Third, adding an instrument smoothing term to rule that already had a nominal anchor and a real variable contributes little to the robustness and e¢ ciency of rules. Fourth, notwithstanding problems of mismeasurement of output gaps, it generally pays for policy to feedback on some measure of excess demand. Fifth, a case can be made for designing simple rules that minimize the use of latent variables like potential output and the equilibrium real interest rate as arguments.
So why are simple rules not as reliable in the current context, when they have been in others? Levin et al. (1999) argue that simple rules do a good job of controlling economies, even in models for which their parameterizations are incorrect. The reason is because Levin et al. (1999) restricted their attention to full-information linear rational expectations models, which tend to be forgiving of wide ranges of policy rule misspeci…cation. Loosely speaking, linear rational expectations models have loss surfaces that tend to be very ‡at in a large neighborhood around the optimized rule parameterization; see, e.g., Levin and Williams (2003) . Economists are fond of rational expectations, and for good reason: it removes a free parameter from the model, and ensures that policy decisions are not founded on what amounts to money illusion. Nonetheless, the sense in which agents are rational is questionable. In environments such as the US economy of the 1990s and 2000s, with bubbles and …nancial crises, amid a broader economy that has produced fewer and milder recessions than before, it seems plausible that the economy has undergone structure shifts.
To the extent that this is so, it seems reasonable to consider expectations that are somewhat less than fully rational-such models may include agents in the process of learning, as Primiceri (2005) and Milani (2007) have done, for example.
